United States v. Urena, 05-2343-cr (2d Cir. March 22, 2006) (found here)
In appealing his sentence, Urena "point[ed] to the use of 'fast-track' programs in other parts of the country as evidence that his 72-month sentence is not 'sufficient, but [rather, is] greater than necessary' to comply with" the statutory sentencing purposes. In a footnote, the Second Circuit declined to address this specific argument because it was not "clear from the record whether the district court specifically considered fast-track programs when it sentenced Urena to a term of imprisonment five months less than the recommended guideline range."
But . . . the Second Circuit commented further. Specifically, the Second Circuit indicated that it is just chomping at the bit to resolve the fast-track disparity issue. Here is what the Second Circuit said:
"In this Circuit, district courts have expressed divergent views on whether a sentencing court can, should, or must consider the wide-spread use of fast-track programs as a factor relevant to an individual defendant's sentence. Compare United States v. Duran, 299 F. Supp.2d 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (fast-track not a relevant consideration), with [United States v.] Linval, [No. 05-CR-245,] 2005 WL 3215155 [(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2005)] (considering fast-track), and United States v. Krukowski, No. 04-CR-1308 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2005) (considering fast-track), and United States v. Deans, 03-CR-387 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2005) (considering fast-track). While this is certainly an intriguing question ripe for resolution by this Court, we need not reach this particular issue here . . ."
Ladies and Gentlemen: Start your word-processors!