United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2008)
Following a guilt plea to securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud, the court sentenced Dupes to 38 months incarceration and 3 years of supervised release. Among other things, the court imposed a special condition of supervised release relating to his prior sex offenses. On appeal, Dupes argued that those special conditions -- which did not relate to his offense of conviction in this case -- exceeded the court's statutory authority and violated the Double-Jeopardy clause of the Constitution. The Second Circuit didn't agree.
Specifically, it found that the court had broad authority pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) to "impose any condition of supervised release that it considers to be appropriate, provided such condition is 'reasonably related' to certain statutory factors" listed in Section 3553(a). Here, the Second Circuit found that each of the special conditions imposed (sex offender registration, keeping a distance from children, etc.) was "reasonably related" to Dupes' history and characteristics as a sex offender, his need for treatment, and the public's need for protection from him. The Second Circuit therefore concluded that such conditions did not constitute a violation of the Double-Jeopardy clause because they constitute lawful punishment.
Perhaps. But something just seems off about this decision. Not only is its conclusion not well supported in the opinion, but it would not pass the "grandmother test": my grandmother would probably have said it was a bunch of hooey because Dupes was not convicted here for any sex offense, and imposing those conditions on him does not seem related at all to his offense of conviction. Indeed, could those conditions have been imposed if Dupes' prior offense dates back, say, 10 years? 20 years? 30 years? Under this decision, the Second Circuit says yes.