United States v. Green, Docket No. 08-5548-cr (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 2010) (found here)
Among other things, Green was sentenced (for his crack cocaine offense) to a term of supervised release that included the following condition: "And of course, as a special condition, you're not to associate with any member or associate of the Bloods street gang or any other criminal street gang." The final written judgment stated as follows: "The defendant shall not associate with any member or associate of the Bloods street gang, or any other criminal street gang, in person, by mail (including email), or by telephone. This shall include the wearing of colors, insignia, or obtaining tatoos or burn marks (including branding and scars) relative to these gangs." It is the "color wearing" condition that the Second Circuit found problematic.
Specifically, the Second Circuit noted that "[d]ue process requires that the conditions of supervised release be sufficiently clear to 'give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.'" Further, a "condition of supervised release must provide the probationer with conditions that 'are sufficiently clear to inform him of what conduct will result in his being returned to prison,' and violates due process if 'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'" With regard to the "color wearing" condition, the Second Circuit found that it:
is not statutorily defined and does not provide Green with sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct. The range of possible gang colors is vast and indeterminate. . . . Eliminating such a broad swath of clothing colors would make his daily choice of dress fraught with potential illegality. People of ordinary intelligence would be unable to confidently comply with this condition.