United States v. Perez, No. 09-CR-629 (JBW), 2010 WL
2540952 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2010)
Perez pled guilty to an illegal re-entry offense, for
which he faced an
advisory Guidelines range of imprisonment of between 21 and 27 months.
He was sentenced to time served (11 months).
Why? Other than his pre-trial detention:
He has a wife and newborn child in Mexico. Violation of supervised release charges remaining pending against defendant relating to another offense, distinct from that before the court. Defendant continues to serve the term of supervised release stemming from that separate offense.
United States v. Bueno, No. 09 CR 625 (HB), 2010 WL 2228570 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2010)
Bueno pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government with respect to claims, conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud with respect to identification papers based on her involvement in a tax refund fraud scheme orchestrated by her husband. The Court sentenced Bueno to a non-Guidelines sentence of 24 months imprisonment (advisory Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months). However, due to extraordinary circumstances relating to the care of her three minor children, the Court ordered Bueno's surrender date be adjourned for 36 months (that's right, three years) or until she is able to find an appropriate caregiver. This is the part of the sentence on which this post will focus.
Buene presented some genuinely unusual circumstances. As described by the Court:
Bueno has three children, ages eight,
four, and two. The father of her first child was deported to the Dominican Republic
in 2006, allegedly renounced his parental rights, and does not have any
apparent contact with either Bueno or their child. Defendant had her other two
children with her co-defendant Castillo, and all three children lived together
with Bueno and Castillo at a residence in Pennsylvania prior to their arrest.
Bueno's oldest child attends third grade, and her four year-old attends a
preschool program. She is an active parent, and participates frequently in her
children's school activities. In a letter to
the Court, one of the teachers at Bueno's cosmetology school says she "is
a hard worker and dedicated student ... is the kind of future professional who
makes me enjoy my job" and that she "observed how great of a mom she
is" because she always checks on her children at class breaks. Another
letter, this one from an employee of the community service center, where Bueno
apparently volunteers and attends "Parents Committee Meetings," wrote
that "she has shown ... good leader[ship] and dedicated to her children's
education." A letter from her child's preschool indicates she is an active
parent and is even the president of their "Family Connection" group.
Letters from friends and family are even more positive and provide universally
glowing accounts of the care she provides her children.
As is perhaps obvious with the conviction
and terms of imprisonment for both Castillo and Bueno, the three children will
need some alternative caregiver to live with and provide for them.
Unfortunately, there is no readily apparent individual available for that
critical task. As just mentioned, the father of her first child was deported
and has no contact. Bueno's father allegedly abused drugs and is otherwise
estranged from Bueno and her children. Bueno's mother stated in a letter to the
Court that she cannot care for the children because she works full-time at a
slaughterhouse, and must leave the house at four-thirty in the morning with no
regular return time. Bueno also has a twenty-two year old sister, but she
likewise works full time, has her own child,
and also stated in a letter that she is unable to care for Bueno's three
children. It is the fate of these children and their future well-being that
influenced the nature of my sentencing decision, and compels this opinion.
Based on the foregoing, the district court noted that "[w]hile family members are often affected when a relative is to be incarcerated, this case presented a fairly unique situation. The three children were in a stable, two-parent household, with an obviously caring mother, and they will now lose both parents to significant terms of imprisonment." Bueno, however, was neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. Thus, the court sought to balance the need for an appropriate sentence with the need to ensure that innocent children are properly cared for and do not become wards of the state, "especially when a sentence can be fashioned that will avoid such a result." Thus, the Court adjourned Bueno's sentence for up to 36 months so that she could find appropriate child care for when she does go off to serve her sentence. She also has to report back to the Court every six months on her efforts to find that childcare.
This is an example of a very human side to sentencing -- a Court that went out of its way to both comply with its judicial obligations, but also to consider the collateral consequences of what it was required to do. It's fair and decent. And it has precedent. Another district court judge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York did essentially the same in United States v. Kloda, 133 F. Supp. 2d 345, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
This is a great case for any defense lawyer working with a defendant who has significant family issues, yet cannot get out from under a jail sentence.
United States v. Coons, No. 07-2485-cr (2d Cir. March 30, 2009) (found here)
Coons received a 2-6 year indeterminate New York state sentence for reckless endangerment. He was released on parole, and subsequently arrested and placed in state custody for violating the terms of his parole. He thereafter pled guilty in federal court to being a felon in possession. His federal sentencing was not held, however, until after he'd been in state custody for 16 months.
At sentencing, the court determined his advisory range to be 27-33 months, and sentenced him to 27 months. The sentencing court did not credit Coons for the 16 months that he'd already been in custody, as it could have under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) and (c). The Second Circuit affirmed, basically holding that the sentencing court affirmatively decided not to give him that credit.
So, yes, Coons could have been in state custody for those 16 months solely because of his parole violation. But the description of the case seems to indicate that his detention was based on the federal gun charges. Even under those circumstances, he was not entitled to credit for the 16 months. But was it fair not to credit him?
United States v. Wood, Nos. CR-88-0723 (CPS), CV-94-4652 (CPS), CV-96-2498 (CPS), CV-02-1678 (CPS), CV-06-2851 (CPS), 2008 WL 163694 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008)
Wood was sentenced to 235 months for his narcotics conviction. On December 17, 2007 he filed a pro se motion after the Sentencing Commission voted to apply the new crack guidelines retroactively. The Court issued an order for the government to show cause why the relief in Wood's motion should not be granted. The Government responded that the relief sought was premature because the new crack guidelines do not become retroactive until March 3, 2008. Not so fast, said the Court:
Although a ruling reducing the sentence before March 3, 2008 may be premature, Wood is likely to qualify for resentencing to a term of imprisonment that expires on March 3, 2008, thereby making him eligible for release on that date. Given the substantial likelihood that Wood will be successful on the merits of his motion and the irreparable harm that would result to him if he were to remain incarcerated for a longer period of time than necessary, the government is hereby directed to state its position in writing on Wood's eligibility for resentencing on or before January 22, 2008, and to produce defendant before the undersigned on February 4, 2008, when the motion will be argued.
This is the second in a now growing trickle of retroactivity motions, and the second time an offender likely will be eligible for immediate release upon the effective date of retroactivity. Motions of this sort raise a whole host of questions. From the public's perspective, will the naysayers and politicians who opposed retroactivity use individuals like Wood as poster-boys for the release of convicted felons onto the streets? Will that cause any public backlash? From the prosecutor's perspective, will U.S. Attorneys Offices nationwide be clogged with motions like that filed by Wood that will require responses from individuals who likely were not involved in the original cases? Will they be able to find the files from cases years ago? Can they handle the volume? From the courts' perspective, are the two cases so far identified in the Second Circuit an indication that, to paraphrase Dr. Martin Luther King, judges feel that they are "free at last" from harsh crack guidelines and intend to do something about it? Stay tuned.
Unger v. United States, No. 02 CV 4240, 2007 WL 3353515 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2007)
Petitioner Ari Unger brings an unusual claim. He contends that he was incorrectly credited for time served toward his federal sentence and, as a result, prematurely returned to New Jersey state custody. Petitioner seeks his return to federal prison.
Unusual indeed. Appeal denied, though, because Unger had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover, since filing his petition, Unger had been released on parole from state custody. Consequently, the court could not grant relief that would satisfy his request.
United States v. Hall, Docket No. 05-6919-cr (Aug. 30, 2007) (found here)
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence, but remanded to amend the written judgment to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) -- the district court judge had given only an oral explanation for the below-Guidelines sentence imposed. Here is the guidance the Second Circuit provides to district courts in putting together their written explanations of reasons (note the question I pose at the bottom):
In requiring sentencing judges to include a statement of reasons in the written judgment under section 3553(c)(2), as we do here, we are not suggesting that judges must denote every fact discussed in the setencing colloquy. Indeed, nothing stated in this opinion should be interpreted to "require the district court to utter any specific incantation." [citation to United States v. Rattoballi, discussed here and here, omitted.] We do not understand Congress's intent in enacting section 3553(c)(2) to have been to divert district courts' attention from conducting a thoughtful, on-the-record, face-to-face sentencing exchange with criminal defendants to obsessing over the inclusion of every material sentencing fact in a written order of judgment. We are, moreover, mindful that the circulation through the Bureau of Prisons of a detailed statement of the facts underlying some reasons can present particular concerns, as for example, when a statement references sensitive information about crime victims, the defendant, or members of his family. Thus, we reiterate that the statutory requirement for specific reasons does not necessarily require an exhaustive statement of facts. Indeed, a simple summary of facts should generally suffice for Bureau of Prisons review. In conducting our own appellate review of the reasonableness of the sentence, we can, of course, look beyond the reasons stated in the written judgment to consider, as we have in this case, a district court's oral statements of reasons at sentencing as well as the full record of proceedings.
Does the final part of this statement indicate some inclination toward de novo sentencing review?
United States v. Grimaldi, Crim. No. 3:01cr131 (JBA), 2007 WL 1051451 (D. Conn. April 5, 2007)
How much does it cost to insure the life of a defendant on supervised release? $2,915 per year. How much does it cost to insure the life of the same individual not on supervised release? $940 per year.
What's a defendant to do when he finds out about the cost differential? Seek early termination of his supervised release and have the court agree that: (1) he "has commendably complied with all required conditions of his supervised release, including payment of fine and restitution"; (2) "he has been in compliance with all terms and conditions of his supervised release, and has satisfied the fine and restitution obligations of his sentence, including payment of all applicable back taxes and completion of community service; (3) the "United States Probation Officer supports [his] request for early termination; (4) he has undertaken volunteer work as part of a program of rehabilitation; (5) he has satisfied eight of the nine extra-statutory factors to be considered in determining whether to approve early termination of supervised release; (6) "there is nothing to fault and much to commend about the defendant's post-release conduct"; and (7) "his moral compass will never again take him so far off course."
What did the district court do? Deny the petition. Why?
While Grimaldi's apprehension about providing for the financial needs of his wife and parents if he should die is understandable, he points to no particular risk that his life expectancy is compromised in any way. Moreover, while Mr. Grimaldi may not have known about this consequence of his conviction, it is not a new circumstance, and since a term of supervised release is statutorily required for his offense of conviction, the increased premium is a consequence for every convicted felon seeking a life insurance policy with Prudential.
United States v. Pierre, No. 05-6629 (2d Cir. Sept. 22, 2006) (found here)
A quick note on an above-Guidelines sentence affirmed as reasonable, albeit in a slightly different context.
Pierre violated the terms of his probationary sentence and was sentenced to two years imprisonment for that violation -- notwithstanding that the Government and the advisory Guidelines revocation table (Section 7B1.4(a)) called for a sentence of between three and nine months. The Second Circuit affirmed the two year sentence as "substantively reasonable" in light of the district court's findings, including that it had already afforded Pierre substantial lenience and that Pierre had demonstrated a total lack of respect for the law as well as a pattern of criminality. The court also noted Pierre's cognitive and psychological limitations, "but found that this circumstances did not explain or excuse the extent of his failure while on probation."
Although likely warranted here, the affirmance of this above-Guidelines sentence is consistent with the discouraging nationwide pattern of reversing below-Guidelines sentences as unreasonable and affirming above-Guidelines sentences as reasonable.
As an aside, the Second Circuit noted in an unusual footnote that "[a]lthough it is not this Court's role to determine where Pierre is held during the term of his incarceration, we hope that efforts are made to ensure that he is in a facility that provides the mental and vocational services he clearly needs." Query whether the BOP will ever receive this message from the Second Circuit.
United States v. Hilario, Docket No. 05-3972-cr (2d Cir. May 24, 2006)
Hilario plead guilty to consipring to import ecstasy into the United States and received a sentence of 162 months imprisonment. Hilario had previously served 26 months imprisonment in Belgium on a related charge. At sentencing, the district court reduced Hilario's sentence by 26 months (to the 162 month term of imprisonment imposed) to account for the time that he served in Belgium on the related charge. The district court did not, however, credit Hilario for the 4 months of "good-time" credit that he likely would have "earned" if he had served that 26 month term of imprisonment in the United States rather than in Belgium (in other words, the district court did not sentence him to 158 rather than 162 months imprisonment).
The Second Circuit rejected Hilario's argument, finding that "the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a downward departure on the basis of Hilario's speculative assertion that he would have earned good time credit in a BOP prison had he served his time in such a facility." The Second Circuit's analysis is interesting because it seems to indicate that there was no abuse of discretion by the district court because Hilario's assertion was "speculative." Does that mean that the district court would have, in fact, abused its discretion if Hilario's assertion had not been "speculative"? I suspect not because of the discretion with which district courts are vested when it comes to downward departure motions. I am curious, however, as to whether Hilario made his argument solely as a downward departure motion or whether he also relied on it in seeking a non-Guidelines sentence pursuant to one of the Section 3553(a) factors. Unfortunately, the Second Circuit's opinion does not provide such information.
Grullon v. United States, Docket Nos. 98 Cr. 524 (RCC), 04 Civ. 5766 (RCC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2006)
Just a quick note to follow up the discussion below of Hickman v. United States. In Grullon, the defendant argued in a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (among other things) his attorney "should have argued at his sentencing that he should receive credit for time he served on a related state charge." Judge Casey of the Southern District of New York rejected defendant's argument and, in doing so, noted that his attorney had raised the issue at sentencing and that "the Court expressly declined his application." Thus and notwithstanding the absence of any legal discussion on the point, Judge Casey's findings concerning the entitlement to good time off of a federal sentence for time served on a state conviction are consistent with those of Judge Crotty.
