No Credit For You!

United States v. Coons, No. 07-2485-cr (2d Cir. March 30, 2009) (found here)

Coons received a 2-6 year indeterminate New York state sentence for reckless endangerment.  He was released on parole, and subsequently arrested and placed in state custody for violating the terms of his parole.  He thereafter pled guilty in federal court to being a felon in possession.  His federal sentencing was not held, however, until after he'd been in state custody for 16 months. 

At sentencing, the court determined his advisory range to be 27-33 months, and sentenced him to 27 months.  The sentencing court did not credit Coons for the 16 months that he'd already been in custody, as it could have under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) and (c).  The Second Circuit affirmed, basically holding that the sentencing court affirmatively decided not to give him that credit. 

So, yes, Coons could have been in state custody for those 16 months solely because of his parole violation.  But the description of the case seems to indicate that his detention was based on the federal gun charges.  Even under those circumstances, he was not entitled to credit for the 16 months.  But was it fair not to credit him?

A Non-Guidelines Sentence Based On The History And Characteristics Of The Defendant

United States v. Ahmad, No. 08-CR-460 (JBW), 2009 WL 700870 (E.D.N.Y. March 16, 2009)

The Court calculated Ahmad's Guidelines offense level to be 10 for Count 1 of a two count indictment (charging possession and use of a United States Permanent Resident Card issued in the name of another, knowing that the document was procured by means of a false statement and fraud).  His advisory Guidelines range was 6-12 months imprisonment.  The Court, however, imposed a non-Guidelines sentence of 1 month imprisonment for the following reasons: (1) Ahmad was well educated, having received a college degree in Pakistan; (2) he "is a hard and conscientious worker, having had success as a car service driver and gas station attendant, among other employment positions" (3) he has "paid taxes while living and working in the United States"; (4) a "substantial amount of his earnings have been sent to his wife, young children, and elderly parents in Pakistan"; and (5) he "suffers significant pain in his arm, the consequence of a serious accident in 2001, which requires ongoing medical attention."

Unfortunately, Ahmad was also convicted of aggravated identity theft, which required a mandatory, consecutive 24 month term of imprisonment.  Thus, in total, he was sentenced to 25 months imprisonment.

Serving Time For The Same Crime

United States v. Armstrong, No. 07-CR-874 (JBW), 2008 WL 5459177 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2008)

This is interesting. 

Armstrong pled guilty to a serious offense -- he was "a member of a gang that disturbed the peace and threatened the safety of a public housing project."  The advisory Guidelines recommended a 135-168 month sentence (and a 5 year mandatory minimum), yet Judge Weinstein sentenced him to 84 months.  Why?  Well, "Armstrong's childhood was affected by inadequate parental control."  Moreover, he was "of slight stature and juvenile appearance, which may make his time in prison particularly hazardous."

But perhaps more interestingly, he "had already served fourteen months time under a state sentence for essentially the same conduct." 

Why Was The Sentence Not Challenged For Substantive Reasonableness?

United States v. Ortiz, No. 06-4030-cr, 2007 WL 3230734 (2d Cir. Nov. 1, 2007)

An interesting appeal.  Ortiz, who pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of firearm, was sentenced to the statutory maximium of 10 years imprisonment -- more than double the high end of the 46 to 57 month range recommended by the advisory Guidelines.  Specifically, the district court ordered Ortiz to serve 5 years of his sentence concurrently with a previously imposed 15 year state sentence, and to serve the remaining 5 years consecutively to the state sentence.  On appeal, however, Ortiz did not challenge the substantive reasonableness of his very long sentence.  Rather, "his sole challenge on appeal is that the sentence was unreasonable insofar as it failed to account for the Guidelines' policy statements concerning the imposition of concurrent and consecutive sentences . . . ."  Yes, good grounds for appeal.  But why not also test the substantive reasonableness of the sentence itself?