United States v. Castillo, No. 03 CR. 835 (RWS), 2007 WL 195442 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2007)
As readers of this blog know, the district court in United States v. Castillo (discussed here) sentenced Castillo to 87 months imprisonment based largely on the unwarranted sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine (the 100:1 ratio). On appeal, the Second Circuit held that "district courts do not have the authority to reject unilaterally the 100:1 ratio on policy grounds," and remanded the case for resentencing.
Well, Castillo has now been resentenced. How much time? 87 months. Again. (Notwithstanding an advisory Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months imprisonment).
On what did the district court base its non-Guidelines sentence? Well, it surely was not the 100:1 crack/powder ratio. Rather, it was the full panoply of 18 U.S.C. ยง 3553(a) factors, including: (a) Castillo's lack of criminal history; (b) Castillo's young age; (c) the unlikelihood of Castillo recidivating; (d) Castillo's post-arrest rehabilitation (i.e., electrical training in prison).
What did the district court have to say about the 100:1 crack/powder ratio and the Second Circuit's reversal of its prior decision?
Finally, this court concluded its May 20, 2005 opinion that the 100:1 ratio of crack to powder cocaine employed by the Guidelines resulted in an unwarranted sentencing disparity that lacks persuasive penological or scientific justification and created a racially disparate impact in federal sentencing. Although the Second Circuit's thorough historical analysis did not refute, and in many ways highlights, the lack of evidence in support of the supposed increased harmfulness of crack versus powder cocaine embodied in the Guidelines, the appellate court rejected this sentencing disparity argument for other reasons. Accordingly, it will not be repeated here.
The district court did note, however, that Castillo had preserved the 100:1 crack/powder issue for subsequent appeal in light of the Supreme Court's consideration of Claiborne.
The original basis for the 87 months sentence was rejected. But the 87 month sentence still stands, albeit on different grounds. Will the Government appeal again? And, in light of the wide variance from Castillo's advisory Guidelines range, will the Second Circuit find the sentence substantively unreasonable as it did recently in Tupin (discussed here)?
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