United States v. Williams, et al., Docket Nos. 05-4928-cr(L), 05-4956-cr(Con) (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 2007) (found here)
Two quick points concerning Williams.
First, the Second Circuit held that it has the authority to review a sentence for reasonableness following a Crosby remand regardless of whether the district court takes the opportunity to resentence pursuant to Crosby ("We hold that we review a sentence for reasonableness even after a District Court declines to resentence pursuant to Crosby"). This makes sense.
Second, the Second Circuit found that the district court did not fail to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when it stated at resentencing that it was obligated to impose a reasonable sentence after considering the § 3553(a) factors. In doing so, the Second Circuit distinguished between the obligations of district courts (to impose sentences "pursuant to the requirements of § 3553(a) -- including the requirements of § 3553(a)'s parsimony clause") and the obligations of appellate courts ("to review the sentences actually imposed by district courts for reasonableness").
Is there really such a clear distinction? Surely, district courts look to have their sentencing decisions affirmed on appeal -- whether based on ego or on serving the goal of complying with the law. And, with the knowledge that their sentencing decisions will be reviewed for reasonableness, isn't it reasonable for district courts to consider whether or not a sentence is reasonable? And, particularly after Claiborne (hopefully) clears up what reasonableness review entails, won't district courts be even more careful to confirm that the sentences they impose are, in fact, reasonable?
In fact, very few sentences are reviewed for reasonableness, and I think a district court's prinicipal obligation is to make a sound sentencing decision in light of the facts and 3553, rather than be unduly concerned with a possible appeal outcome. Therefore, I think this distinction is important and is rightly stressed by the 2d circuit.
Consider an analogy to when judges are considering whether to grant a preliminary injunctions. Should it be focused on whether a PI is warranted or instead just on whether it would not be abusing its discretion to grant/deny a PI?
Posted by: Doug B. | February 06, 2007 at 11:30 PM